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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a civil action for declaratory relief between an insurance company and a claimant 
to potential insurance proceeds concerning the interpretation and application of a commercial 
general liability insurance policy with respect to the duty of the insurance company to pay certain 
damages, court costs and aHorney fees awarded to the claimant in a lawsuit against the insurance 
company's insured. 
Proceedings Belryw 
The parties to this appeal include Plaintiff / Appellant / Cross-Respondent Employers 
Mutual Casualty Company (herein "EMC") and Defendants / Respondents / Cross-Appellants 
David and Kathy Donnelly (herein "Donnelly"). R Vol. 1, p. 194-195. Parties to the district 
court proceedings, but not parties on appeal. include district court defendants RimaI' 
Construction. [nco (herein "RCI") and Ivan Rimar (herein "Ivan"). Jd. 
On May 24.2007, EMC instituted a declaratory judgment action against Donnelly and 
RCI to establish that under its policy of insurance EMC had no duty or responsibility to pay all, 
or any portion, of the damages then claimed by, and later awarded to, Donnelly in litigation 
between Donnelly and RCIIIvan (herein referred to as the "Declaratory Judgment Action"). R 
Vol. 1, p. ] 7-24. In the Declaratory Judgment Action, RCI made a counterclaim against EMC 
alleging bad faith, violation of the Consumer Protection Act and breach of contract. R Vol. 1, p. 
35-44. However, Donnelly initially made a simple denial ofEMC's claim for declaratory relief. 
R Vol. L p. 27-30. 
On December 12,2007, the district court entered an order staying the Declaratory 
Judgment Action until such time as the litigation between Donnelly and RCI/Ivan was concluded. 
R Vol. 1, p. 111-113. Once the Underlying Litigation was concluded. the district court lifted its 
of the Declaratory Judgment Action. which was effective on July 17,2009. R Vol. 1. p. 
156-158. Thereafter. a Settlement Agreement was entered into between EMC, RCI and Ivan, the 
terms of which effectuated the following: (a) EMC had no duty. responsibility or legal liability to 
satisfy the judgments entered against RCI/Ivan payable to Donnelly and that EMC had no duty to 
indemnify RCI from the same: (b) RCI and Ivan agreed that their counterclaims alleged in the 
Declaratory Judgment Action would be dismissed with prejudice: (c) RCI and Ivan released and 
discharged fMC for and f}'om all liability whatsoever that EMC may have to RCI or Ivan in 
relation to the defense of the Donnelly claims and related to the Declaratory Judgment Action; 
and (d) ReI and Ivan vvould not contest the Declaratory Judgment Action and they admitted all 
of the allegations made by fMC in the Declaratory Judgment Action. R Vol. 3. Clerk's Exhibits 
(P/(fil7fiff's /vlotion/or Summwy Jud,e;ment. Ex. J. filed Nov. 12.2009). 
EMC and Donnelly then moved for summary judgment and essentially stipulated to the 
existence of the material facts. none of which were in dispute. R Vol. 1. p. 194-201; Vol. 2. p. 
249-282: Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's lvfotion/or SU711maryJudgmenf. and Exhibits, filed 
Nov. 12,2009). The district court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment by Order 
entered April 7.2010. R Vol. 2. p. 317-324. The district court reasoned there was a question of 
fact as to whether the damages awarded to Donnelly in the litigation with RCI/Ivan were property 
damage or contract based damages. the resolution of which would resolve the insurance coverage 
question in the Declaratory Judgment Action. R Vol. 2. p. 322. 
While the summary judgment proceedings were ongoing, Donnelly amended its answer to 
2 
EMC's petition and alleged a counterclaim against EMC, not seeking any award of damages on a 
claim. but rather asserting a counter-petition for a declaratory judgment on the insurance 
coverage issues. R Vol. 2, p. 283-288. Thereafter, Donnelly again amended its answer and 
counterclaim. continuing pursuit of the counter-petition for a declaration of insurance coverage, 
and still not seeking an award of money damages against EMC, but rather the avoidance of 
EMC's settlement agreement with RCf based upon a theory of fraudulent conveyance. R Vol. 3. 
p.398-430. 
Following the district court's decision to deny cross-motions for summary judgment, 
EMC and Donnelly sought reconsideration. R Vol. 2, p. 375-377; Vol. 3, p. 457-459. On 
reconsideration. the district court determined that there \vas no insurance coverage for 
$126.61 1.55 in actual damages received by Donnelly against RCI, but that there was insurance 
coverage for costs and attorney fees in the sum of $296,933.89 awarded to Donnelly against RCI 
as a result of its judgment in the underlying litigation. R Vol. 3, p. 473-491. The parties then 
entered into a Stipulation filed with the district court on February] 8,201 I, which had the effect 
or - (I) dismissing, with prejudice, all of RCI's claims against EMC; (2) dismissing. with 
prejudice. Donnelly's fraudulent conveyance claims against EMC and RCI, with each party to 
bear its own fees and costs on the issue: and (3) waiving EMC's right to contest Donnelly'S 
standing in this action. including upon appeal. R Vol. 3, p. 504-509. The district court accepted 
the stipulation of the parties by an adopting order. R Vol. 3, p. 510-513. The district court then 
entered a final Judgment consistent with the Stipulation and the Court's ruling on the cross-
motions for reconsideration. R Vol. 3, p. 514-517. 
After the district court entered the Judgnlent, Donnelly requested an award of costs and 
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attorney feeso R VoL 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Memorandwn of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed MaL 
8. 2011)0 Donnelly further requested that the district comt amend the Judgmenfo R VoL 3, po 
524-5250 EMC timely objected to both requests for post-Judgment relief R VoL 3, po 526-527; 
o 3. Clerk's Exhibits Uv[emorandwn in Opposition to )"10tion to Amend Judgment, filed APL 
8. 201 1)0 On May 20. 20 11, the district court entered its order denying Donnelly any award of 
court costs or attorney feeso R VoL 3, po 541-5450 
Disposition Beluw 
In the proceedings below. the district court granted in part. and denied in part, the 
declaratory relief requested ofEMC as against Donnellyo As such. by contrast. the district court 
granted in part and denied in part. the declaratory relief requested of Donnelly as against EMC 
The district court also denied Donnelly's request for an avvard of court costs and attorney feeso 
EMC appeals as to the district courfs JlIdgment with respect to that portion declaring that 
there is insurance coverage for costs and attorney fees in the slim of $296.933089 awarded to 
Donnelly against ReI as a result of its judgment in the underlying litigationo R VoL 3, po 531-
5350 Donnelly appeals as to the district court's Judgment with respect to that portion declaring 
that there was no insurance coverage for $126,61 1055 in actual damages received by Donnelly 
against RCI as a result of its judgment in the underlying litigation, and further appeals as to the 
district court's Order denying Donnelly an award of costs and feeso R VoL 3, po 547-5490 
Statement of Facts 
THE ApPLICABLE INSURANCE POLICYo On September 14,2004. EMC and RCI entered in 
to an agreement of insurance known as a Commercial General Liability policy, identified as 
Policy No. 2Dl-32-95-05, whereunder EMC was the insurer and RCI was the insured (herein 
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"the Applicable Policy"). R Vol. 2. p. 202-203; Vol. 3. Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintzff's iViotion/or 
SZll7l17wry Judgment, Ex. A, filed Nov. 12, 2009).1 The effective dates of coverage under the 
Applicable Policy began October 1,2004 and ended October 1,2005. Jd. The coverage limits 
under the Applicable Policy are $1.000,000 per occurrence. Jd. The pertinent coverage portions 
of the Applicable Policy provide as follows: 
We vvill pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance 
applies.::> 
This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property damage" only if: 
(1) The "bodily inj ury" or property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that 
takes place in the "coverage territory"; (and] 
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy 
period[.]' 
The Applicable Policy defines a bodily injury as follows: 
''Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death reSUlting from any of these at any time . .J 
The Applicable Policy defines property damage as follows: 
"Property damage" means: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of 
that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of 
the physical injury that caused it; or 
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such 
loss of LIse shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that 
IRelevant excerpts to the Applicable Policy are attached hereto at Addendum A. 
2See Section I.1.a. of the Applicable Policy. 
"See Section Ll.b. of the Applicable Policy . 
.JSee Section V.3. of the Applicable Policy. 
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caused it. 5 
The Applicable Policy defines an occurrence as follows: 
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions.6 
The Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intended from the standpoint of 
the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the 
use of reasonable force to protect persons or property. 
The Contractual Liability Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
"Bodily injury or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay 
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This 
exclusion docs not apply to liability for damages: 
(1) That the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreemcnt[.JR 
Additionally, the Applicable Policy contains a Supplementary Payments Provision 
which provides as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS -COVERAGES A AND B 
I. We will pay, \vith respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any 
"suit"' against an insured we defend: 
a. All expenses we incur. 
5See Section V.17. of the Applicable Policy. 
OSee Section V.l3. of the Applicable Policy. 
7See Section 1.2.a. of the Applicable Policy. 
8See Section I.2.b. ofthe Applicable Policy. 
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c. All costs taxcd against the insured in the "suit. ,,9 
Relative thereto, the Applicable Policy defines "suit" as "a civil procceding in which damages 
because of , bodily injury', 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' to which this 
insurance applies are alleged."io 
THE U;-":OERL YING LITIGA TION. Relevant to tbe district court proceedings was certain 
underlying litigation between Donnelly, as Plaintiff, and RCI and Ivan, as Defendants, in Case 
No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County, Idal1o). the proceedings of which were conducted before the 
same district court (herein ·'the Underlying Litigation"). R Vol. 1, p. 195. The Underlying 
Litigation was commenced on March 7.2006. ld In the Underlying Litigation, Donnelly alleged 
damages were owed to it from RCI and Ivan based upon remodeling construction work 
per/cmned on the Donnelly bome in 2005. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's iYiotion/(}r 
SlI177l1lWY JU((f!;men{, Ex. 13, p. 2, filed Nov. 12,2009). The legal theories of liability alleged by 
Donnelly included breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud, nondisclosure, professional 
malpractice. negligence. breach of warranties, violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, 
quiet title. and for a declaratory judgment. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintitl's MOlion/or 
Slimmary JU((f!;ment, Ex. B. filed Nov. 12, 2009). 
Part of Donnelly's claim was one allegation that bodily injuries had been suffered by 
reason of carbon monoxide poisoning from the improper installation of a propane stove. R Vol. 
3. Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motionjor Summary Judgment, Ex. B. p. 5, filed Nov. 12,2009). 
Before trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court ruled that Donnelly's claim regarding bodily 
0See Section I.Supp. Pmt. of the Applicable Policy. 
IOSee Section V.18. of the Applicable Policy. 
7 
injuries (i.e. the carbon monoxide poisoning) could not be presented to the jury at trial. R Vol. 3, 
Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's l,;fotionfor Summary Judgmen{, Ex. C, p. 2-3, filed Nov. 12,2009). 
It ,"vas because of this allegation that EMC had provided a defense to RCI in the Underlying 
Litigation under a complete reservation of rights. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's 
Ho/ion/or Summary Judgment, Ex. L filed Nov. 12,2009). As early as September 5, 2006, 
EMC advised its insured, RCI, that -
There is no coverage for allegation of construction defects and/or contract breach 
alleged in the complaint because they do not involve property damage. Moreover. 
Exclusions a. and m. and Endorsement 2280 apply to bar coverage for intentional 
injury. damage to your work, loss of use expense caused by delay and damage 
caused by professional engineering or architectural work respectively. However, 
because there is a potential for coverage of bodily injury caused by carbon 
monoxide EMe is providing a defense. 
R Vol. 3. Clerk's Exhibits (Plain/iff's Motion/or SummaryJZldt{l1lent, Ex. I, p. 7. filed Nov. 12, 
20(9) (emphasis added). 
At trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court instructed the jury on applicable law, 
including the following notable instructions -
Q That Donnelly'S claim that ReI failed to perform in a workmanlike manner is a 
claim implied by operation of law; and 
That a necessary eJement of proof ofthe implied warranty claim included proof of 
the existence of a contract between RCI and Donnelly. 
R Vol. 3. Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's ivJotion/or Summary Judgment, Ex. D, Instr. 48. 49, 51, 
filed Nov. 12.2009). The trial in the Underlying Litigation concluded with entry by the jury of a 
Special Verdict on July 9, 2008. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary 
JlIdt{ment. Ex. E, filed Nov. 12,2009). Based on the Special Verdict, it was determined that ReI 
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breached its contract with Donnelly, including breach of the implied warranty of workmanship, 
and also violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Jd Based on the Special Verdict, it was 
determined that RCI and Ivan did not breach any warranties, did not commit fraud, and did not 
engage in professional negligence. Jd The jury awarded Donnelly the sum of $126,611.55 for 
breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and an additional $2,000.00 for violation of the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. ld 
As a result of the foregoing, a judgment was entered in the Underlying Litigation 011 
August 14,2008 requiring RCI to pay the sum of$128,611.55 to Donnelly for breach of the 
implied warranty of workmanship ($126,611.55) and for violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act ($2,000.00). R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiffs lv/orion/hr Summary 
.Jw('Sl7lcn/, Ex. F, filed Nov. J 2.2009). Post-verdict the district court in the Underlying 
Litigation awarded Donnelly costs as a matter of right, and attorney fees, and in so holding did so 
011 the hasis that -
$126.611.55 in damages accounted for compensation to Donnelly for construction 
defects on their home, and an additional $2,000.00 for Consumer Protection Act 
violations; 
The basic issue litigated in the Underlying Litigation was whether or not the 
construction was completed in a workmanlike manner; 
Donnelly prevailed by proving RCI failed to substantially perform the work ti 
contracted to perform: 
The contract between Donnelly and RCI constituted a commercial transaction; 
The construction contract was breached by RCI by not completing the work it 
9 
contracted to perform in accordance with its agreement with Donnelly, or 
pursuant to sound construction practices in a workmanlike manner; and 
The gravamen of the action involved construction defects. 
R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (PlaintifTs !vlotionjor Summary Judgment, Ex. G, filed Nov. 12, 
2009). An Amended Judgment was consequently entered on March 20,2009 awarding Donnelly 
an additional $277,062.00 for attorney fees and $19,871.89 for court costs as a result of a 
contract-based commercial transaction, for a total recovery by Donnelly of $425,545.44. R 
Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's /vio/ionfor Summary JucZl!;ment, Ex. H, filed Nov. 12,2009). 
In the Underlying Litigation, EMC provided a defense against the suit, throughout its entirety, 
under express and complete reservation of rights, which was ret1ected in a letter to ReI on 
September 5, 2006 and in a letter to Ivan on September 7, 2007. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits 
(Ploin/ifrs IV/o//on/o!' S'wnmary Judgment, Ex. I, filed Nov. 12,2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the district court err in determining that, under a policy of general liability insurance, 
the insurer had a duty to pay attorney fees and court costs taxed against the insured in a 
suit brought by the policy claimant for which defense was provided by the insurer, but 
where no part of the damages awarded to the policy claimant were subject to policy 
coverage? 
2. Was the district court correct in determining that, under a policy of general liability 
insurance, the insurer had no duty to indemnify with respect to eontract-based damages 
awarded to the policy claimant in a suit with the insured where the policy included an 
exclusion for liability due to contract? 
]0 
3. Was the district court correct in determining that attorney fees may not be awarded 
pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 where the suit was not between the insurer and 
insured. and where the claimant made no demand by proof of loss upon the insurer? 
4. Was the district court correct in determining that attorney fees may not be awarded 
pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) where no contract exists between the parties and 
where the parties were not engaged directly in a commercial transaction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court applies the same standard as that applied by the district court when reviewing 
orders granting summary judgment. Goodman v. 1 "othrop, 143 Idaho 622, 626 (2007). Summary 
judgment is governed by Rule 56, IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The standard of review 
for a summary judgment motiol1, as articulated by this Court is as follows -
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings. depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any. show that there is no genuine issue as 10 any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw 
.. " [The J Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of the nonmoving party 
and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conf1icting inferences from the evidence presented. If the 
moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the 
nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact ... [t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory 
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. 
Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133 (2002) (internal citations omitted). As to issues 
of law implicated by a summary judgment ruling, this Court exercises free review. McColm-
Traska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 500 (2003). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
EMC insured RCI under a commercial general liability policy. This policy was not a 
performance bond and insured only RCrs liability for resulting property damage or bodily injury 
caused by ReI. ReI undertook home renovations and remodeling for Donnelly. Donnelly was 
dissatisfied with the work performed and brought suit against Donnelly. Donnelly also alleged 
bodily injury due to carbon monoxide poisoning. As a result of the bodily injury allegation, 
EMC defended ReI in the action viith Donnelly. By the time that action \vent to jury triaL the 
bodily injury claim 'vvas dismissed. After j ury trial. Donnelly was awarded actual contract-based 
damages for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship, and statutory damages for violation 
of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Donnelly also received an award of attorney fees and 
court costs. 
In this action. EMe sought a declaratory judgment that the damages awarded to Donnelly 
were not covered by the insurance policy. Donnelly counter-claimed for declaratory relief that the 
damages were covered. The district court properly determined that the actual contract-based 
damages were not covered because the insurance policy excluded from coverage losses arising 
fi-om contract liability. The district court properly determined that the statutory damages were 
not covered by insurance because they did not represent "property damage." and because they 
were an expected or intended injury. 
The district court erred in its determination that the fees and costs taxed against ReI were 
covered by insurance. Under the plain language of the insurance policy, fees and costs taxed 
against an insured related to non-covered claims are not covered. Moreover. payment of fees and 
costs taxed against an insured are a supplemental payment provided only when coverage applies. 
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'vVhere there is no coverage, EMC has no duty to make a supplemental payment. A supplemental 
payment provision does not create additional coverages. EMC provided a defense to RCI under a 
complete reservation of rights, and the district court's determination ignores that circumstance. 
As a matter of public policy, an insurer defending under a reservation of rights ought not be 
required to bear the taxation of fees and costs where the claimant only recovers on non-covered 
claims. The better rule is to encourage vigorous and robust defense of insureds by only requiring 
an insurer to bear the taxation of fees and costs as to covered claims. In doubtful cases. this will 
encourage insurers to provide their insured with a defense. 
Post-judgment. the district court properly determined that Donnelly was not entitled to an 
award of fees and costs related to this declaratory judgment action. Donnelly had no direct 
insurance relationship with EMC and made no proof of loss demand upon EMC. Moreover. 
)unl1clly and FMC had no contractual relationship with one another. and there was never any 
cOlllmercial transaction oet\veen them. 
The district court ought to be reversed inasmuch as it determined that fees and costs taxed 
against RCI in the litigation with Donnelly is subject to insurance coverage. As to all other 
aspects of the district court's Judgment, it ought to be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT EMC HAD A DUTY TO 
PA Y ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS TAXED AGAINST ITS INSURED IN 
LITIGATION IN WHICH EMC PROVIDED A DEFENSE, UNDER A RESERVA TION 
OF RIGHTS, BUT WI-JERE THERE WAS NO COVERAGE FOR THE 
SUBSTANTIVE DAMAGES A WARDED TO THE POLICY CLAIMANT. 
Donnelly obtained a verdict against EMC's insured, RCI, only on claims alleged against 
ReI which were non-covered claims. Specifically, in the declaratory judgment action, from 
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\yhich this appeal is taken, the district court held on summary judgment that neither the damages 
on the warranty of workmanship claim nor the damages awarded on the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act claim were covered under the EMC Policy. R Vol. 3, p. 482-484. Thus, the 
district court held that EMC was not obligated to pay the judgment on those claims under its 
policy with RCI. ld. 
E:vfC had defended the case under a complete reservation of rights based solely upon the 
initial claim for bodily injury contained in the original complaint: 
There is no coverage for allegation of construction defects and/or contract breach 
alleged in the complaint because they do not involve property damage. Moreover, 
Exclusions a. and m. and Endorsement 2280 apply to bar coverage for imentional 
injury. damage to your work, loss of use expense caused by delay and damage 
caused by professional engineering or architectural work respectively. However, 
because there is a potential for coverage of bodily injury caused by carbon 
monoxide EMC is providing a defense. 
R Vol. l. Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintitts MOlionfhr Summary Jud;;ment. Ex. 1, p. 7. filed Nov. 12, 
20(9) (emphasis added). Before trial in the Underlying Litigation. the Court ruled that 
Donnelly's claim regarding bodily injuries (i.e. the carbon monoxide poisoning) could not be 
presented to the jury at trial. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's l'Vfotionj(Jr Summary 
.J/{(.~f!;menf. Ex. C, p. 2-3. filed Nov. 12,2009). Additionally, Donnelly admitted that they did not 
present any evidence of bodily injury at the trial of the Underlying Litigation. R Vol. 2, p. 238. 
Thus. the underlying trial proceeded on claims consisting of breach of contract, 
misrepresentation, fraud, nondisclosure, professional malpractice, negligence. breach of 
Vvarranties. violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, quiet title, and for a declaratory 
judgment. 
At the underlying trial, Donnelly prevailed on the claims that RCI breached its contract 
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with Donnelly, including breach of the implied warranty of workmanship, and also violated the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Attorney fees were then awarded, based entirely upon the 
Donnelly's success on non-covered claims. 
Donnelly demanded that EMC pay the attorney fees assessed against RCI pursuant to the 
"Supplemental Payments" provision of the EMC policy, despite the fact that the underlying 
claims \vhich gave rise to the fee award were not covered. The district court granted Donnelly 
summary judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, ordering that the Applicable Policy did in 
fact require the payment of fees under the "Supplemental Payments" provision. The district 
court erred in reaching this conclusion. 
A. The plain and unambiguous language of/he Applicahle Policy indicates that 
E/vIC has no duty to pay costs andfees taxed against its insured ·with respect to 
non-covered claims. 
The supplementary payments provision only requires payment of attorney fees awarded 
against the insured on covered claims because the language - "supplementary payments" -
indicates that payments will only be made in addition to payments on the underlying claim, and 
because of the limiting language that the supplementary payments only apply in suits where 
damages "to which this insurance applies are alleged". 11 
In Idaho, when interpreting insurance policies, courts apply the general rules of contract 
law subject to certain special rules of construction. Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 145 
Idaho 459. 461 (2008). In Farm Bureau ofIns. Co. ofIdaho v. Kinsev, this court expanded on 
Ii Courts have interpreted this language to mean "in cases where the insurance applies'" 
as will be discussed in Section I.C. herein. See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Mintarsih, 175 
Cal. App. 4th 274, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Cal. App. 2009); Burlington Ins. Co. v. Devdhara, 20] 0 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99955 (N.D. Calif. 2010). 
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this holding, setting forth those special rules of construction -
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion that are not usually subject to 
negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity in a policy is construed strongly 
against the insurer. Where the language used in an insurance policy is clear and 
unambiguous, the language must be given its plain, ordinary meaning. Coverage 
will be determined according to the plain meaning ofthe words in the policy. "A 
provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations." If confronted with ambiguous language, the 
reviewing court must determine what a reasonable person would understand 
the language to mean. 
]49 Idaho 415. 419 (20] 0) (quoting Allstate Ins. ('0. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 597 (1999)) 
(emphasis added). 
fn this case, the policy language clearly provides that the payments of attorney fees and 
costs are "supplemental" to coverages A and B. Under the rules of construction as set forth by 
this Court. where language is cleaL it "must be given its plain, ordinary meaning'" Id. Black's 
Dictionary defines "supplemental" as "[t]hat which is added to a thing or act to complete it." 
BLACK'S LA W DICTIONARY (6th ed.). Webster's detlnes "supplemental" as "[a]dded to supply 
\\ hat is wanted; additional: being, or serving as. a supplement .... " WEBSTER'S 1913 
DICTIONARY (emphasis added). Thus. the plain meaning of the supplementary payment section 
is to provide payment which is "additional" or "added to" the underlying payment of covered 
claims. If there is no underlying coverage for the underlying claims, there can be no 
"supplemental" payments. 
To the extent that the language is ambiguous, the Court must determine what a reasonable 
person would expect the language to mean. Under the circumstances present in this case, it is not 
reasonable to expect that, while there is no coverage for the claims brought at trial and from 
which damages were awarded, there is coverage for attorney fees stemming from the non-
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covered claims. See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Mintarsih, 175 Cal. App. 4th 274, 95 
CaI.Rptr. 3d 845 (Cal. App. 2009) ("just as an insured could not reasonably expect an insurer to 
pay defense costs in a suit in which there was no potential for coverage, an insured could not 
reasonably expect an insurer to pay costs awarded against an insured in such a suit"). 
The district court erred in finding that the Applicable Policy language unambiguously 
provided coverage because it did not consider all of the policy language in reaching its decision. 
Specifically. the district court ignored the definition of "suit" set forth in the Applicable Policy. 
In its analysis on pages 13-15 of its Order. the district court does not address the Applicable 
Policy language defining "suit.'· R Vol. 3. p. 485-487. The district court held that "the policy 
does not plainly state that payment of assessed costs may be made only if there is coverage." R 
Vol. 3, p. 486. However, the clear language of the Policy does provide a "supplemental 
payment" only for "costs taxed against the insured in the ·suit'''. which is in turn defined as "a 
civil proceeding in which damages because of 'bodily injury', 'property damage' or 'personal 
advertising injury' to which this insurance applies are alleged.,,12 By ignoring the additional 
language found in the definition of "suit" the district court erred in determining that the clear 
language of the Applicable Policy required payment of costs and fees awarded against the 
insured. 
B. The district court misapplied Idaho authority 'with respect to coveraf!,ejorfees 
and costs faxed relative to non-covered claims. 
In reaching its decision, the district court relied upon authority of this Court from 1989 
vvhich held that attorney fees assessed against an insured were to be paid as costs under a 
12See Section V.18., and Section LSupp. Pmt. ofthe Applicable Policy (emphasis added). 
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homeowner's policy, even when the underlying claims were not covered. See Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009 (1989). However, the policy language in that case differs 
substantially from the language in the policy between EMC and RCI, and thus the holding in that 
case should not be applied to this case. Rather, the better analysis is found in a 2009 case out of 
California, wherein the court determined that under a policy with language virtually identical to 
that in the Applicable Policy, attorney fees were not payable under a "Supplemental Payments" 
provision \vhen the underlying claims were not covered. 
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, this Court held, based upon language in a 
"Supplementary Coverages" section in a homeowner's policy which provided that the company 
would pay "all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company", the 
company was liable to pay attorney fees assessed against its insured even though the underlying 
cLlims \\cre 110t covered under the policy. In reaching its conclusion, the Court specifically noted 
lhat "(tlhe I'esults in the cases depend 'upon the language employed by the parties in their 
(L,,,ntract;' and concluded that the "language in the policy of/his case does n01 indicate that the 
payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the policy covers the insured's 
conduct. ,. ld. at 1012 (emphasis added). Even the Mutual of Enumclaw court recognized that its 
holding was dependent upon the policy language in each case. Thus, the holding in Mutual of 
Enumclaw must be limited to that case alone and should not be extended to this case, because the 
EMC policy differs from the Mutual of Enumclaw policy in significant respects. 
In interpreting the policy language in Mutual of Enumclaw, the Court found that the 
language that the company would pay "all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by 
Company" as well as the placement of the language "under a heading named' Supplementary 
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Coverages' implies that the provisions therein are separate from and in addition to the basic 
policy coverage." ld. at ] 012. Based upon the placement of the language, the Court concluded 
that the obligation to pay such eosts was not affected by the fact that the policy did not cover the 
underlying claim for intentionally tortious conduct. ld. 
The Applicable Policy language providing for payment of costs taxed against the insured 
is not contained in a separate heading entitled "Supplemental Coverage" and, thus, the placement 
issue significant to the Court in Mutual of Enumclaw is not present in the Applicable Policy. 
Rathel'. the language in the Applicable Policy is included under a heading entitled 
"Supplemental Payments- Coverages A and B." This heading implies that when coverages A or 
B apply, EMC will make the following supplemental paYments. It does not state that it is a 
"supplemental coverage". separate from the underlying coverage. The language providing for 
payment of costs in Mutual of Enumclaw stood on its own, whereas the language in the 
Applicable Policy is tied to Coverages A and B. This placement and language are 
di:ctinguishable from the language and placement in Mutual of Enumclaw. 
Additionally. the Applicable Policy contains language limiting the eoverage for attorney 
fees to those "suits" \vherein damages "because of 'bodily injury', 'property damage' or 
'personal advertising injury' to which this insurance applies are alleged."13 The policy in Mutual 
of Enumclaw did not contain such limiting language and can also be distinguished on that fact. 
Becausc thc language and placemcnt of language differs from the Applicable Policy, and because 
the Mutual of Enumclaw policy did not contain limiting language found in the Applicable Policy, 
it is not clear that tbe payment of such costs in the Applicable Policy is "separate from or in 
13See Section V.18., and Section l.Supp. Pmt. of the Applicable Policy (emphasis added). 
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addition to the basic policy coverage" as the Court concluded it was in Mutual of Enumclaw. In 
fact, based upon the placement of the language. and the limiting language found in the definition 
of"suiL" the holding in Mutual of Enumclaw should not be extended to this case. 
Interestingly. the district court in Mutual of Enumclaw noted that it "found no authority 
directly on the issue of whether an insurer must pay costs when none of the judgment attributable 
to the insured's conduct was covered by the basic policy." See Record in Idaho Supreme Court 
17449. at 342.1-1 FMC has found no Idaho authority on point since. Thus. it appears 
that Mutual of Enumclaw is the only Idaho case arguably on point. and, as discussed above, 
should not be extended to the facts of this case. 
C. The dis/rict court erred in not considering and adopting persuasive awhority 
indicating that there is no insurance coverage for and costs faxed relative [0 
non-covered claims. 
In i1s motion for summary judgement, EMC directed the district court to a 2009 case out 
or California. in which the California Court of Appeals held that under a "supplemental 
jXl\l1lents" provision in its policy. State Farm was not obligated to pay attorney fees taxed against 
its insured that arose solely out of non-covered claims. See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. 
Mintarsih, 175 Cal. App. 4th 274, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Cal. App. 2009). The district court did 
not even discuss this case. or the rationale of the California court in its decision, despite the fact 
that the case interpreted a nearly identical policy and provided a sound rationale and public 
policy reasons for its decision. 
Mintarsil1 involved an underlying case wherein the plaintiff brought claims for false 
\~ The Supreme Court found that the district court opinion "explained the facts and the 
law in this case extremely well" and for that reason, it "adopt[ ed] his opinion, in substantial part 
as [its] own." Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1010. 
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imprisonment negligence, fraud and wage and hour violations under the Labor Code. State 
Farm defended this "mixed" coverage ease under a reservation of rights. Plaintiffs prevailed and 
were awarded attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party on thc wage and hour claims. These 
were not covered claims. 
There were two State Farm policies at issue in Mintarsih. The first was a homeowner's 
policy that provided State Farm would pay "certain 'claim expenses' over and above the limits of 
liability. including (1) 'expenses we incur and costs taxed against the Insured in suits we defend' 
... :' Slate Farm. 175 Cal.App. 4th at 279. The Mintarsih court characterized this provision as a 
"supplemental payments" provision. rd. This language is nearly identical to the language in the 
Applicable Policy, which provides coverage in addition to the limits of insurance for "costs taxed 
against the insured" in "any 'suit' against an insured we defend".''i The second State Farm 
pol icy was an umbrella policy which provided coverage: '''When the claim or suit is covered by 
this policy. but not covered by any other policy available to you: ['lJ ... ['\IJ .. , we will pay the 
vve incur and costs taxed against you in suits we defend;' .... " State Farm, 175 
Cal.App. 4th at 280. Again. this policy has language like the Applicable Policy and hinges on 
suits in which the company defends the insured. 
In analyzing the coverage issue, the Mintarsih court explained that in earlier California 
cases. the court had "rej ected a literal interpretation" of policy language providing coverage for 
expenses in "any suit against the insured we defend" and had "concluded that the obligation to pay 
a cost a\vard could arise only if the insurer had a dutv to defend the insured. [The court] stated that 
just as an insured could not reasonably expect an insurer to pay defense costs in a suit in which 
15See Section V.I8. of the Applicable Policy. 
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there was no potential for coverage, an insured could not reasonably expect an insurer to pay costs 
awarded against an insured in such a suit." ld. at 285 (emphasis added). The rationale behind 
these rulings "vas that, if every time a company defended under a reservation of rights and 
was later found not to have a duty to defend the company still had to pay costs taxed to the 
insured, it would discourage insurers from providing a defense when coverage was in doubt. 
Thus. the California court held that if no contractual duty to defend arose, a company would not 
have to pay costs taxed against an insured, even if the company did defend under a reservation of 
rights. This rationale encourages insurance companies to provide a defense to their insureds in 
cases involving mixed claims. 
The decision in Mintarsih was folhwed recently by a California Federal District Court. fn 
BurJinlLton Ins. Co. v. Devdhara, 20] 0 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99955 (N.D. Calif 2010), the plaintiff 
insurance company had defended a class action case against its insured under a reservation of 
rights. Id. at 7. The case was ultimately settled, and the court order approving the class action 
settlement approved attorney fees for the opposing parties, which it deemed were reasonable. Id. 
at Burlington paid $276,080.52 of those fees. ld..:. Burlington then filed its action seeking 
reimbursement from its insured for the amounts paid in settlement of the claims, which it argued 
were non-covered claims, the amounts paid in defense of the underlying action and the amounts 
paid to the opposing party as costs and fees. 
Burl ington argued that it was entitled to all fees paid on behalf of its insured because the 
attorney fees and costs awarded to the plaintiffs in the underlying action were only covered by the 
policy "ifthose fees and costs stem from potentially covered causes of action." Td. at 23 (citing 
State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Mintarsih, 175 Cal. App. 4th 274, 284-84, 95 Cal Rptr. 3d 845 
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(2009)). Like in this case, the underlying case had involved the allegations of potentially covered 
claims: a habitability tort claim. The court found that any fees paid which arose from non-covered 
claims were not covered by the policy and should be reimbursed. In this case, all the fees awarded 
stemmed from non-covered claims. Thus, under the reasoning and holding in Burlington, 
payment of those fees would not be covered. 
The holding and rationale set forth in Mintarsih, supra, and affirmed in Burlington Ins. Co. 
\. De\dhara, Slipra, should be applied in this case; wherein EMC has defended a '-mixed" case, 
under a reservation of rights: wherein some claims were covered and others were not and \vherein 
damages and costs were awarded based solely on contract claims that were not covered. To hold 
othcnvisc \vOLlld create a chilling effect on insurance carriers' willingness to defend cases under a 
reservation of rights. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is evident that the only Idaho precedent close to the facts is 
not controlling because the Court limited its holding to the policy language in that case, which 
language and placement differs from that in the Applicable Policy. The most persuasive authority 
addressing the issue in this case are Mintarsih and Devdhara, recent cases out of California, which 
support the conclusion that costs and fees mvarded against RCI are not covered by the Applicable 
Policy. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT EMC HAD NO DUTY 
TO INDEMNIFY THE CONTRACT-BASED DAMAGES AWARDED TO DONNELLY 
DUE TO EXCLUSIONS IN THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
The district court determined that the Applicable Policy did not provide coverage for the 
contract and statutory based damages awarded to Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation with RCI 
and Ivan. R Vol. 3, p. 473. As to the non-coverage of the contract-based damages, the district 
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court recognized that the damages awarded to Donnelly were based on a claim of breach of the 
implied \varranty of workmanship, which under the facts and circumstances of the Underlying 
Litigation sounded in contract. R Vol. 3, p. 482-483. The district court properly recognized that 
"EMC's Commercial General Liability insurance policy does not act as a performance bond; and 
it does not provide for payment of damages resulting from a breach of contract." R Vol. 3. p. 483. 
The district court further recognized that statutory-based damages were not subject to insurance 
coverage because those damages were not "property damage" and because they were subject to 
the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion. R Vol. 3, p. 483-484. The decision of the district 
court that the substantive losses of Donnelly were not subject to coverage is soundly supported by 
factual record below and the law applicable thereto. The reasoning of the district court is well 
articulated in its Order and should be affirmed. R Vol. 3, p. 473-484, 489. 
The jury 's verdict in the Underlying Litigation allocafedfindings of/Clcf as to the 
claims olliabilify and the district court ',)'judgment then allocated damages based 
Up017 fhoseJindings. 
An unallocated general verdict was not entered by the jury in the Underlying Litigation, 
Rather. the jury returned a special verdict. from which the district court applied the law toward 
entry of a judgment. This is important because "general verdicts do not involve factual findings 
but rather ultimate legal conclusions," Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods. Inc., 339 F.3d 1020,1031 
(9 th Cir. 2003), On the other hand, a "special verdict" is one in which "the jury makes findings 
only 011 factual issues submitted to them by the judge, who then decides the legal effect of the 
verdict.'· BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, at 1697 (9th ed. 2009). This meaning is confirmed by the 
Supreme Court. vvhich has stated that a "special verdict is. , . [w]here the jury states the naked 
facts as they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the eOUli thereon." Statler v. United 
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States. 157 U.S. 277, 279 (1895). 
It is clear that the verdict rendered by the jury in the Underlying Litigation is a special 
verdict. The verdict docs not contain any generalized findings in favor of one party or the other 
follovved by a general award of damages. Rather. the verdict contains the jury's response to a 
number of factual questions posed to it concerning whether certain facts were proven. R Vol. 3. 
Clerk"s Exhibits (Pla;ntifTs Motionfhr Summary Judgment. Ex. E, filed Nov. 12,2009). For 
instance. the jury answers "yes" to a question of whether there was a contract between Donnelly 
and ReI. Jd. The jury also answers "yes" to a question as to whether ReI materially breached the 
contract with Donnelly. Jd. The jury goes on to ansvver 39 questions posed to them requiring 
them to make factual determinations. From this. it is clear the role of the jury was to make factual 
determinations to assist the district court in its entry of an appropriate judgment based on 
application of law to the facts determined by the jury. As sllch. the jury returned an allocated 
"spL'cial verdier' and not an unallocated "general verdict." The special verdict was allocative in 
lhat it made an actual determination of the facts that were a prerequisite to the claims of the 
parties, and on those claims which formed a basis for relief. it allocated the proper award of 
damages. 
As a result of the jury's allocated special verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the district 
court applied the jury's findings to the claims and entered an appropriate judgment. R Vol. 3, 
Clerk's Exhibits (PlaintifFs A1otion/or Summary Judgment, Ex. F, filed Nov. 12,2009). The 
judgment allocated liability among the various claims involved in the Underlying Litigation. 
The judgment actually goes through each claim for relief asserted by the parties in the Underlying 
Litigation and makes a determination of liability. For instance, the judgment recites that Donnelly 
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prevailed on its breach of contract claim against RCL as well as on its breach of the implied 
\varranty ohvorkmanship. ld. However. it recites that RCI prevailed on Donnelly's claim of 
breach of express warranty. ld. 
In addition. the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation also allocated damages 
among the claims upon which relief was found to be appropriate. For instance, damages were 
only mvarded on three distinct and separate claims. The judgment awarded $126,611.55 for 
breach of the implied vvarranty of workmanship. and $1,000.00 each on two separate claims for 
violation of consumer protection statutes. ld. Such finite and discreet recitals, findings and 
conclusions represent an allocated verdict - it is known with precision and exactness the claims 
upon which relief was granted and the damages awarded upon each claim. 
Since it is specifically known upon which claims in the Underlying Litigation relief was 
granted. and the precise amount of damages awarded on each claim, it is not difficult to apply the 
reqUired hlets and law on those matters to the Applicable Policy to determine whether coverage 
appli,:s. All the district court had to do \vas apply the legal meaning of the provisions of the 
Applicable Policy to the known facts and law governing the claims upon which relief was granted 
to Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation. The district court properly proceeded in that regard and 
made the right decision with respect to Donnelly's substantive awards of damage in the 
Underlying Litigation, to wit -
1. An award of$126,61l.55 in actual damages for RCI's breach of the implied 
warranty of workmanship; and 
2. An award 01'$2,000.00 in statutory damages for ReI's violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
26 
B. The actual dwnages Q}varded to Donnelly in the Underlying Dfigafian are 
excluded/i'om coverage hecause the liability jar the damages was the result ala 
contract. no! tortious conduct. 
All of the actual damages allocated in the judgment in the Underlying Litigation due to 
Refs breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. in the sum of$126,611.55, are a liability 
of RCI assumed by obligation of contact that is excepted from coverage under the Applicable 
Policy. The most telling evidence of the same is the instructions provided by the district court to 
the jury in the Underlying Litigation because. as the word implies, instructions are instructive. 
In ;-v1agic Valley Potato Shippers v. Continental Insurance, ] 12 Idaho 1073 (1987). like 
here. the trial court was called upon to determine whether damages awarded in an underlying 
lawsuit were based in tort or contract because damages based on contract would not be covered by 
insurance. while damages based on tort may be covered by insurance. Magic Valley, ] 12 Idaho at 
1075- J 077. This Court determined that the damages were based in contract and therefore 
excluded from coverage based on the contract liability exclusion. Id. at 1076-77. In so doing, this 
COLIrt relied upon the claims as alleged in the complaint, and upon the district court's 
instructions to the jUry. Id. at 1076. Because the instructions to the jury made it clear that the 
jury had to find the existence of a contract to assess liability and damages, the action was found to 
be in contract. ld. As a natural result thereof the damages were contract based and excepted 
fl:om coverage. kL. at 1077. The circumstances of this action are no different. 
Because the instructions are instructive, it is appropriate to examine how the district 
court instructed the jury in the Underlying Litigation. With respect to the implied warranty of 
workmanship. the district court made the following notable instructions to the jury in the 
Underlying Litigation -
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"The Donnellys' allege that [ReI] breached implied warranties by failing to 
perform the agreed upon construction in a workmanlike manner" - placement of 
the phrase "agreed upon" implies the existence of a contract: and 
.. "In a construction contract. there is an implied warranty that the work is to be 
completed in a workmanlike manner" - use of the phrase "construction contract" 
expresses that the claim sounds in contract: and 
"With regard to the claim of the implied warranty of workmanship, the Donnellys 
have the burden of proving ... [a] contract existed between [ReI] and the 
Donnellys" - the fact that the existence of a contract is a necessary element of the 
claim demonstrates that it sounds in contract: and 
.. In assessing damages for breach of the impl ied warranty of workmanship the jury 
was to award damages for "those losses and expenses which may reasonably have 
been in contemplation of both parties as a probable result of such breach when the 
contract was made" - the district court's use, yet again, ofthe word "contract" 
indicates that the damages to be awarded are in the nature of contract. 
R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintifl's Mo{hm/or SU11ll71my Judgment, Ex. D, filed Nov. 12, 
2009). The instructions provided by the district court unequivocally indicate that the claim upon 
vvhich reliefvvas granted to Donnelly (breach of the implied warranty of workmanship) was a 
claim that sounded in contract. There is no other explanation for the repetitive use of the words 
"contract" and "agreed." There is no other explanation for the fact that the district court instructed 
the .i my that it must find the existence of a contract to find for Donnelly. Just as in Magic Valley, 
the instructions to the jury exemplify the fact that the district court, and the parties, understood 
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that the claim sounded in contract. 
There is no coverage under the Applicable Policy for bodily injury or property damage 
which the insured is obligated to pay because ofliability imposed by contract. The Applicable 
Policy specifically provides that "[tJhis insurance does not apply to ... 'property damage' for 
which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a 
contract or agreement."lh The distinction here is not whether the damages are "property 
damage" or contract type damages. as originally argued by Donnelly. but rather whether the 
damages are based in contract or tort - the express terms of the Applicable Policy already require 
that the damages be in the nature of "property damage" to be covered, but if property damages are 
a\\arded based on a contract theory they are excluded from coverage. This is the obvious and 
plain meaning of the contract liability exclusion. This is why this Court. in Magic Vallev. 
explained that damages were not payable by an insurer due to a contract liability exclusion where 
the damages sought by and awarded to the claimant were based in contract, not in tort. Magic 
Vallev. 112 Idaho at ]076-]077. 
Additional support for the fact that the implied warranty claim is a claim sounding in 
contract is found in the post-trial decisions of the district court in the Underlying Litigation. The 
district court. in awarding attorney fees to Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation. recognized that 
an award of fees was proper because RCI failed to substantially perform the work it contracted to 
perform. the contract between Donnelly and RCI constituted a commercial transaction, and the 
gravamen of the action involved construction defects. R Vol. 3, Clerk's Exhibits (Plaintiff's 
Mo/ion/hr Summary Judgment, Ex. G, filed Nov. 12,2009). This reflects the district court's 
16See Section I.2.b. of the Applicable Policy (emphasis added). 
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understanding that contract claims 'vvere the gravamen of the Underlying Litigation, as opposed to 
any tort claims. The Court determined that the implied warranty claim sounded in contract and 
therefore avvarded attorney fees to the prevailing party. ld This fwiher demonstrates that the 
implied warranty claim was one in contract for which coverage is not afforded under the 
Applicable Policy due to the Contractual Liability Exclusion. The district court correctly 
determined that the actual damages arose from a liability assumed by contract, and that therefore 
they were not subject to coverage under the Applicable Policy. 
(. The statulOlY damages awarded to Donnelly in the Under!yjng Litigation are 
excluded/i'om cm'erage because the damages are no! property damage. 
The statutory damages of $2,000.00 a\'varded to Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation are 
not covered by the Applicable Policy because the damage award does not reflect "property 
damage:' The Applicable Policy only provides coverage for ·'property damage:' which requires 
physical injury to tangible property, which can include resulting loss of use of the tangible 
property, in which event the loss of usc is deemed to have occurred at the time of the physical 
injury that caused the loss of use. Property damage also includes loss of use of tangible property 
that is not physically injured, in which event the loss of use is deemed to have occurred at the time 
of the occurrence that caused it. Tangible property is '·property that has physical form and 
characteristics:' BLACK'S LA \V DICTIONARY. at 1254 (8 th ed. 2004). 
A physical injury does not include pure economic loss. As such "property damage" does 
not include pure economic loss. which is a loss not recoverable under tort law, but recoverable 
only under contract law. Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37,41 (1987). The cost to repair 
or replace defective property that is the subject of a transaction is pure economic loss, not property 
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damage. ld. Further, correlative claims for lost value or loss of profits or use are not property 
damage. but afe pure economic losses. ld. In essence, for "property damage" to occur there must 
be some damage to property other than that which is the subject of the transaction. Ramerth v. 
Hart. J 33 Idaho 194, 196 (J 999). Where there is no accident, and no physical damage to property, 
there is no property damage for which recovery can be had under tort law, as opposed to contract 
law. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 333 (1978). So, it is clear that a physical 
i nj L1ry to property requires that there is an actual physical change or alteration of property. whether 
it be altered in appearance, shape. odor or some other material dimension. See Traveler's Ins. Co. 
v. Fljer Mfg .. Inc., 757 N.E.2d 481,496 (Ill. 2001). 
Donnelly vvas awarded $2,000 in damages for RCI's violation of the Consumer Protection 
These damages arc a category of damages that arc purely statutory in nature and not 
associated \vith the loss of use of property or of physical injury to tangible property. As sllch. 
there is no coverage Jor damages resulting from Rimar's failure to follow the Consumer 
Protection Act. The district court properly recognized that the statutory damages were not 
"property damage. ,. 
D The statutmy damages avt'arded to Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation are 
excluded/rom coverage because they were expected or intended by ReI. 
As an independent and alternative grounds of determination, the district court also 
determined that the statutory damages allocated in the judgment in the Underlying Litigation due 
to RCTs violation of consumer protection statutes, in the sum of $2,000.00, were a liability of 
RCI that was expected or intended from the standpoint of ReI. As such, the district court 
determined, quite properly, that the statutory damages were excepted from coverage under the 
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Applicable Policy. 
The Applicable Policy contains a typical Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion that 
explains there is no coverage for any bodily injury or property damage that is expected or intended 
from the standpoint oftbe insured. This Court has held that the language of limitation contained 
in many policies to tbe effect tbat damages expected or intended from tbe standpoint of the 
insured are not covered is clear, concise and unambiguous. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 
137 Idaho 832. 837 (2002). As such. this exclusion is applicable to this action, and is not subject 
to construction in favor of coverage. 
To establish violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Donnelly had to establish 
(hal RCI engaged in some conduct prohibited by the Act with actual knowledge or under 
circumstances where the exercise of due care would impose such knowledge. See IDAHO CODE § 
48-603. The significant portions of the Act under which Donnelly argued liability against RCI 
related to those portions that involve deception. falsity, failure to perform promises, misleading 
cond Llcl and fail me to follow statutory requirements (e.g., nondisclosures). R Vol. 3, p. 484. All 
of these are of a nature tbat RCI would need to have knowledge or intent in its conduct. The 
Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion absolutely bars coverage for any bodily injury or property 
damage that is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured or any of its employees. 
For Donnelly to prevail on its claim of violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, it had to 
establish that RCI knowingly violated the provisions of the Act. This means that RCI would 
reasonably have expected damage to occur if it violated the Act. As such, the statutory damages 
for vlihich RCI is legally obligated to pay to Donnelly on account of violation of the Idaho 
COI1SlImer Protection Act are not covered under the Applicable Policy. The district court 
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correctly made this determination. 
Ill. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ATTORNEY FEES 
COULD NOT BE AWARDED. PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 41-1839, TO 
DONNELL Y BECAUSE DONNELLY HAD NO INSURANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH 
EMC AND HAD NOT SUBMITTED A PROOF OF LOSS. 
The district court correctly determined that Donnelly was not entitled to an award of 
attorney fees in the present declaratory judgment litigation because Donnelly was not an insured 
of UvlC. and even if Donnelly had that status, Donnelly had failed to show evidence of the 
submission of a proof of loss as required by IDAHO CODE § 41-1839. R Vol. 3, p. 544. IDAHO 
CODE § 41-] 839, in relevant part, provides as follows -
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance. surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proofofloss has been furnished as provided in such 
policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the amount justly 
due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action thereafter brought 
against the insurer in any court in this state or in any arbitration for recovery under 
the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court 
shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action or arbitration. 
(4) NOt\vithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section and 
section] 2- J 23. Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the award of 
statutory attorney's fees in all actions or arbitrations between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under policies of insurance .... Section ]2-120, Idaho 
Code. shall110t apply to any actions or arbitrations between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance. 
1D,,\I-IO CODE § 41-1839. 
On its face. IDAHO CODE § 41-] 839 provides that a party is not entitled to an award of fees 
unless the insurer fails for a period of 30 days after a proof of loss is furnished pursuant to the 
policy to pay to the person entitled the amount justly due under the policy. IDAHO CODE § 41-
I 839(]). [ncident to its request for an award of fees, Donnelly provided no evidence of the 
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submission of a proof ofloss as required by the Applicable Policy, nor did Donnelly provide any 
evidence that EMC failed and/or refused to pay the amount justly due Donnelly under the 
Applicable Policy. R Vol. 3. Clerk's Exhibits (Affidavit ojCounsel in Support ojlY/orion to 
Disallmt' Costs and Fees. p. 2, filed Mar. 21,2011). 
In Carter v. Cascade Insurance Co., 92 Idaho 136 (1968), the Court explained that in order 
to obtain a right to fees there must be a failure of the insurer to pay an amount justly due under a 
policy. and there must be an action against the insurer for recovery of that sum. ld. at 139. The 
Court held that an insurer could not be held liable for fees until the insurer failed to pay a sum 
certain under a policy after it is judicially declared that the insurer had a duty to pay. Me As long 
as the insurer acts reasonably in its refusal to pay a claim. fees ought not be assessed against the 
insurer. hl: In Carter, the Court determined it was reasonable for the insurer to refuse to pay a 
claim since the fault of its insured was reasonably at issue. ld. Similarly, EMC rightfully 
contested its duty to pay the claim of Donnelly for actual damages against its insured. RCI. Its 
refusal was not only reasonable. but EMC was determined to be correct in its assertion that there 
was no insurance coverage for the actual damages of Donnelly. Throughout this action there was 
no determination that EMC had a duty to pay the actual damages, there was no sum certain justly 
due Donnelly from EMC, and EMC's refusal to pay was reasonable. 
In Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663 (1987), the Court 
explained that a party had no right to fees under the Insurance Code if it failed to provide a proof 
or loss to the insurer prior to commencing action against the insurer. ld. at 671. The proof of loss 
has to be furnished at least 30 days prior to the action commencing. ld. In Hansen, the claimant 
was denied attorney fees because it did not submit any evidence of serving a proof of loss on the 
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insurer before the action commenced. Id. The facts of this case are similar. Donnelly has 
submitted no evidence that it served a proof of loss upon EMC for payment of the actual damages 
(l"warded, or even for payment of the fees and costs awarded, in their litigation with RCI. Having 
t~lilcd to present a proof of loss to EMC 30 days before the action, Donnelly is not entitled to an 
avvard of fees. 
In Revnolds v. American Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 362 (1988), the Court 
explained that a party had no right to fees under the Insurance Code where the issue of the suit 
was not for recovery of a sum certain under the policy, but rather related to the insured's conduct 
in the settlement ofthe claim. Where the suit is not for recovery of a sum celiain under the 
pol icy, but rather for some other issue, the prevailing party is not entitled to an award of fees. ld. 
a1366. III this case, Donnelly's claim against EMC was not for recovery ofa sum certain under 
the policy. but rather for ajudicial determination as to whether parts of a judgment they received 
against E]\1C's insured, RCI, were covered under the policy. 
In \nio11 Warehouse and Supplv Co .. Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128 Idaho 660 
(1996), the Court held that a party is not entitled to an award of fees under the Insurance Code 
vvhere the purpose of the action vvas not for recovery of "a specific amount 'j ustly due' under the . 
. . policy." ld. a1669. If the action is not for the recovery of "any specific amount claimed to be 
due" IDAHO CODE § 41-] 839 is not applicable. Id. Specifically, the Court explained that where 
the purpose of the action is to determine insurance coverage for "general type[ s] of damagef s] 
alleged" by a claimant, and not to recover a specific and quantified loss, the prevailing party is not 
entitled to an award of fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839. ld. at 669, n. l. This case was 
commenced to determine whether general types of damages alleged by Donnelly were subject to 
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coverage. This case has never been one to determine whether Donnelly is entitled to recovery of a 
specific and quantified sum from EMC - that is, this case has never been postured as one for the 
recovery of money damages. This case has always been one to obtain a judicial declaration as to 
whether certain claimed damages were subject to coverage. Under these circumstances, no paliy 
has a right to fees under the Insurance Code. 
In Northland Insurance Co. v. Boise's Best Autos & Repairs, 131 Idaho 432 (1998). the 
Court held that a policy claimant ,vas not entitled to fees under the Insurance Code where the 
insurer brought the declaratory action to determine coverage, while at the same time providing a 
defense to the insured 011 the underlying litigation with the claimant. The Court held likewise one 
year later in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocabv. 133 Idaho 593,602 (1999) (it was reasonable and 
justified for an insurer to seek declaratory relief as to coverage while defending its insured. and 
the insurer \vas therefore not required to pay fees under the Insurance Code). The circumstances 
of this casc are similar to Northland and Allstate. EMC initiated this declaratory action to 
determine ,I coverage dispute, but still defended ReI in the Underlying Litigation with Donnelly. 
The weight of the authority demonstrates that in a case such as this no party is entitled to 
all mvard of fees under IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 because (1) Donnelly submitted no proof of loss to 
EMC 30 days before the action began: (2) the action was not for the recovery of an amount justly 
due: and (3) the action was for the determination of rights and obligations, not for the recovery of 
a specific and quantified amount. There is no evidence that EMC acted unreasonably in its 
pursuit of this action, while at the same time defending RCI in the Underlying Litigation. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERL Y DETERMINED THAT ATTORNEY FEES 
COULD NOT BE A WARDED, PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 1 120(3), TO 
DONNELLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION 
BETWEEN EMC AND DON 'NELL Y. 
The district court correctly determined that EMC and Donnelly had no commercial 
transaction or relationship \vith one another. and that therefore an attorney fee award could not be 
made under IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3). R Vol. 3, p. 544-545. IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3), in 
nant part provides as follows -
In any civil action to recover on [a] ... contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods. \\a1'cs. merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by lmv, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes. 
ID;\//O CODE § 1 120(3) (emphasis added). This statute requires that. in the absence of the 
existence of a contract, there must be a tnmsaction, commercial in nature, for a party to be entitled 
to fees. TIllS reasoning is supported by In re: l!niversitv Place / Universitv of Idaho Foundation. 
Inc. v. Ci\ic Partners. Inc., 146 Idaho 527 (2008). where this Court indicated that while the statute 
docs not require a contract "between the parties," it docs require"there be a commercial 
transaction." ld. at 541. 
lIere. there is no indication whatsoever that this action was brought to recover on a 
commercial transaction between EMC and Donnelly. This action was brought to determine rights 
and obligations under an insurance policy between EMC and RCI. Donnelly was included in this 
action not because of a contractual or commercial relationship with EMC but rather as a proper 
party as the claimant to potential policy proceeds. There being no commercial transaction 
between EMC and Donnelly, Donnelly has no rights to an award of fees under IDAHO CODE § 12-
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J 20(3). The district court correctly perceived the foregoing and incorporated it in the denial of 
Donnelly's requested fee award. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
EMC makes no request for an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, EMC respectfully requests that this Court REVERSE the 
district court's determination that EMC has a duty to indemnify its insured \vith respect to the fees 
and costs taxed against its insured in the litigation with Donnelly. EMC respectfully requests that 
this Court AFFIRM all other aspects of the district court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SOBMITTED this 21 sl day of 
David P. Claiborne 
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ADDENDUM A 
Attached are relevant excerpts from the Applicable Policy, which may be found in the 
Clerk's Record at Volume 3, Clerk's Exhibit, Exhibit A to Plaintiff's k/otion/or SummcllY 
Juc~'.!,1I7cnl, tlled November 12,2009. That exhibit to the Clerk's Record inadvertently omitted 
some pages of the policy, which are submitted for augmentation relative to the Stipulated Molion 
10 rillgme n1 fil ed with this Court on September 19. 2011. 
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